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SITE SELECTION FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AND
THE EXPANDED EQUAL PROTECTION CONCEPT
Banks v. Perk, was a class action brought in behalf of all eligible
nonwhite applicants for federally-assisted public housing. The action
was brought in two counts. The first charged that the city of Cleve-
land and its agents denied plaintiffs equal protection of the laws,2
and violated the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 19683 and the Fair
Housing Act 4 by revoking building permits issued for low-income
housing in predominantly white residential areas of the city.5 The
second count alleged that the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Auth-
ority (CMHA) abridged similar rights of plaintiffs by failing to
place a clear majority of the planned housing projects in white
neighborhoods when the racial composition of the waiting list for
such housing was 90% black.6 CMHA joined in Count I as a cross-
claimant.
The issue presented before the court in Count I was neither novel
nor difficult. The evidence indicated that within two months of tak-
ing office the new administration for the city, whose announced policy
was to oppose low-income housing in neighborhoods where the resi-
dents voiced disapproval, revoked the building permits for two proj-
ects scheduled to be constructed on the west side of the Cuyahoga
River. Although no intent to discriminate was established, the city's
actions had the net effect of perpetuating existing patterns of racial
1. 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972). Federal jurisdiction was invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3)-(4) (1970).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 2000d (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
5. The city of Cleveland is divided nearly in half by the Cuyahoga River.
Most of the city's black population is housed on the east side of the river while
the west is almost entirely white. 341 F. Supp. at 1178. The city itself is second
only to Milwaukee, Wisconsin in residential segregation. Id. at 1181.
6. Plaintiffs apparently contended that low-income housing is the "functional
equivalent" of minority housing. That is, the exclusion of low-income housing
from white areas is the "functional equivalence" of exclusion by race. See gener.
ally Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), for the foundations of the
"functional equivalence" test.
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segregation. 7 Relying on a list of cases in point,s the court had little
difficulty in holding that defendants' actions deprived plaintiffs of
equal protection, subjected them to discrimination on the basis of
color, and denied them equal access to public housing on a nondis-
criminatory basis.9 Since defendants gave no substantial reason for
their action that might amount to a supervening governmental in-
terest,1 0 they were ordered to issue the permits and cautioned not to
interfere or further impede efforts by CMHA to place low-income
public housing in white areas of the city.
The challenge in Count II was more difficult, both in finding
actionable discrimination and fashioning a remedy. An examination
of the evidence indicated that CMHA had unofficially maintained
segregated housing in the past. It presently professed, however, a
policy of dispersal for public housing, and of the total number of
units built in the last five )ears, nearly half were located in white
neighborhoods and a comparable breakdown was planned for future
projects. CMHA admitted, however, that it did not include the
racial composition of surrounding neighborhoods in its site selection
criteria and that no limits were placed on the number of units to be
7. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Supreme Court
interpreted Gomillion to stand for the proposition that the inevitable effect of,
and not the motive behind, a statute or other state action is the key determinant
to its constitutional validity. Recently in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217
(1971), the Court was presented with the issue of whether effect or motive is
the proper test for racial discrimination. Six justices (Burger, Black, Blackmun,
Douglas, Harlan and Stewart) believed effect was the key while three justices
(Brennan, Marshall and White) voted for motive. See also Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967), where the Court held that a statute or state action neutral
on its face which has the effect of encouraging private discrimination is unconstitu-
tional.
8. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1971) (holding unconstitutional a refusal by the city
to permit plaintiffs to tie sewers from low-income housing into city's sewer system) ;
Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (finding that no ex-
planation other than racial motivation was possible for city's refusal to grant a
zoning variance to construct low-income housing in a white residential area); Crow
v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972)
(holding use of conditional zoning variances to defeat public housing projects in
white neighborhoods unconstitutional).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 2000d, 3601 et seq. (1970).
10. A state or city has the duty to insure compliance with the Constitution
when it puts its property, power and prestige behind any program. Colon v.
Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). A vari-
ance with this mandate is permissible only when a compelling governmental in-
terest can be shown. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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built in the black areas of the city. 1 A look at the entire picture
indicated that the attempts by CMHA to integrate and disperse public
housing were not very successful.2 Generally, the racial composition
of the housing projects tended to mirror the racial composition of the
census tracts in which they were located: blacks in the east and whites
in the west.
Thus the court was presented with a situation where racially
neutral and apparently good faith efforts by CMHA to disperse hous-
ing contributed to de facto segregation. 3 The central issue presented
in Banks was whether the placement of any low-income housing in
black areas under the circumstances was consistent with the four-
teenth amendment, or, in other words, does CMHA have an affirma-
tive duty to remedy segregation it did not cause?14 The court held
that the national policy concerning public housing, as reflected in
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, places on all local housing authorities
the duty to take affirmative action to provide fair housing for all on
a nondiscriminatory basis."; This duty necessitates a commitment to
the dispersal of public housing throughout the city,16 and requires
the local housing authority to carefully consider the racial impact of
its decisions.17 Consequently, the racial composition of proposed loca-
11. 341 F. Supp. at 1181-82.
12. At the time the suit was filed, approximately 90% of the applicants for
family housing units were black and approximately 62% of these units were
located on the east side of the river. This last statistic, however, does not reflect
the true status of segregation in Cleveland. CMHA followed a freedom of choice
plan wherein impartially selected applications were sent to managers of each
complex who were thereafter free to select the applicants who would fill their
vacancies. As a result the racial composition of each housing complex was closely
linked to the prejudices of each complex manager. For the purposes of the pre-
liminary injunction, however, the court chose not to consider CMHA's tenant
selection policies but recognized that active discrimination may be practiced
daily in the program. 341 F. Supp. at 1182.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1184.
15. For a summary of the development of federal policy concerning housing
equality see Maxwell, HUD's Project Selection Criteria-A Cure for "Imper.
missible Color Blindness?", 48 NoT=E DAMF. LAw. 92 (1972); Pearl & Terner,
Fair Housing Laws: Halfway Mark, 54 GEo. L.J. 156 (1965); Note, Public Hous-
ing and Integration: A Neglected Opportunity, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRon. 253
(1970); and Note, Discriminatory Site Selection in Public Housing and Federal
judicial Response, 64 Nw. U.L. Rav. 720 (1969).
16. See note 15 supra.
17. See also El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson
Housing Authority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (1969), where the Court of
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tions for public housing must be an integral part of the authority's
site selection criteria. Placing family units in black neighborhoods
when the city is racially segregated and where a majority of the appli-
cants are black continues the isolation of blacks and inhibits their
ability to break out of the ghetto. Regardless of motive, such action
prevents blacks from competing on an equal basis and therefore
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'8
The district court credited CMHA with a good faith effort to dis-
perse public housing in Cleveland, but held that its conception of
dispersal did not meet the standards of the fourteenth amendment.
Implicit in the concept of dispersal is the notion that some sort of
balance must be reached. This balance cannot be attained if new
projects are built in racially concentrated areas at a rate equal to that
of projects constructed elsewhere. 9 To insure rapid compliance, the
court enjoined CMHA from selecting or considering sites on the east
side of the Cuyahoga River.
Typically, local housing authorities and the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) have been unable to fulfill the
national mandate on nondiscriminatory site selection.20 Until a very
few years ago, courts avoided site selection problems by claiming
that local authorities required wide discretion to discharge their
duties, and that in the absence of a clear showing of bad faith by
public officials, no violation of equal protection would occur.21 After
Appeals of Arizona ruled on the basis of the language contained in 24 C.F.R. § 1.4
(1969), but recognized that the equal protection clause also supported the result.
18. See note 7 supra.
19. 341 F. Supp. at 1184.
20. Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L.
REv. 63, 114-16 (1970). Three factors contribute to this result: First, sites for
public housing are generally subject to review by local governmental bodies.
Community opposition manifests itself in a failure to approve sites selected by
local housing authorities. Second, land in white neighborhoods is generally more
expensive and local housing authorities often forego selection of sites in white
districts because the minimum cost per unit set for HUD allotments cannot be
met or because community needs demand quantity rather than location. Third,
white areas are usually zoned to permit fewer families per dwelling thus causing
the local housing authorities to run into the same cost problems because they
cannot take advantage of economies of scale. All three of these factors are rec-
ognized by HUD as legitimate excuses for a failure to achieve nondiscriminatory
site selection. See HUD, Low-RENT HoUSING MANUAL (1967). For a discussion
of HUD's authority see Lefcoe, HUD's Authority to Mandate Tenants' Rights
in Public Housing, 80 YALE L.J. 463 (1971), and Maxwell, supra note 15.
21. See Thompson v. Housing Authority, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966);
Varnadoe v. Housing Authority, 221 Ga. 467, 145 S.E.2d 493 (1965); In re
Housing Authority 235 N.C. 463, 70 S.E.2d 500 (1952).
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Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,22 however, courts began to
be more aware of the site selection problems. In Gautreaux, the court
held that a pre-clearance agreement between the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA) and the city, wherein each alderman had veto
power over sites selected in his district, was in violation of the four-
teenth amendment.23 By constructing low-income housing on sites
chosen because more desirable sites were rejected by a racially moti-
vated aldermanic council, CHA, in effect, adopted the city's discrim-
inatory practices as its own policy. In addition, the court permitted
statistical inference of discriminatory intent to be drawn from the
fact that 99j-% of all sites chosen in white areas were rejected while
only 10% in black neighborhoods were disapproved.
The Gautreaux decision found affirmation when the court in Hicks
v. Weaver24 held that sites in all black neighborhoods selected while
the city operated under a de jure segregationist policy violated the
fourteenth amendment because the sites were initially intended to
maintain segregation between the races. In effect, both the Gautreaux
and Hicks decisions made it clear that site selection is highly rel-
evant to nondiscriminatory public housing and that the location of
a majority of the new projects in racially concentrated areas created
a strong inference of illegality.2t To establish a right to judicial relief,
however, the Gautreaux and Hicks courts required a showing of in-
tent to discriminate. In so doing, they failed to recognize that neutral
22. 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (Gautreaux I), 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D.
Ill. 1969) (Gautreaux II), affd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 922 (1971). Gautreaux was the first site selection case in which plain-
tiff prevailed.
23. 296 F. Supp. at 914.
24. 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
25. Both Gautreaux and Hicks substantially expanded the protection of rights
in this area. Neither court spoke in terms of bad faith; rather they held that
disadvantaged minorities have an absolute right to have sites for low-income
housing selected with regard to the racial composition of the surrounding neigh-
borhoods or of the projects themselves. Thus it was no longer permissible tojustify a planned separation of races on the ground that separation was needed
to avoid hostile confrontations and civil unrest. Any purposeful separation is
unconstitutional. In addition, the court in Gautreaux I facilitated class actions
of this nature by holding that the injury of the individual litigant is subservient
to the interests of the group as a whole. Consequently, any class member could
have standing to litigate without showing personal injury. For an excellent dis-
cussion see Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Selection, supra note
20, at 118. See also Note, Housing Law-Discriminatory Site Location and
Tenant Allocation Procedures-Equitable Relief, 1970 Wis. L. Rlv. 559.
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site selection procedures can have the same ill effects as a deliberate
plan 6 and, as a result, put the availability of judicial relief beyond
the reach of injured persons who could not establish proof of intent
to discriminate. 7
Following the traditional equal protection approach of Gautreaux
and Hicks, plaintiffs in Banks undoubtedly would have been denied
relief since CMHA was acting in good faith without intent to dis-
criminate, and, most importantly, its actions were incontestably
"rational."-' 1 Moreover, there is little room to argue that a classifica-
tion by race or some other "suspect trait" was involved. All that
demonstrably could have been proven was that, in light of the existing
social conditions, the particular state action produced a result un-
equal in fact, leaving an identifiable group in worse shape than the
rest of society.L9 The result is de facto segregation for which state
officials traditionally are held unaccountable since the state action
requirement of the equal protection clause is not satisfied.30 The
Banks court, however, adopted an expanded equal protection con-
cept that rejects the need for proving intent or "suspect traits" in
certain civil rights areas. That is, sufficient state action can be found
solely on the basis that state or local officials failed to initiate action
designed to alleviate de facto segregation. A growing number of cases
obviate the necessity of placing the blame for existing segregation
and hold that the equal protection guarantees are violated when
seemingly impartial government programs result in de facto segrega-
26. See Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Selection, supra note 20,
at 125.
27. Comment, Gautreaux v. Public Housing Authority: Equal Protection and
Public Housing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 440 (1970). It should be noted that
this type of proof is usually unavailable since few state agencies openly profess
racism. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
28. Assuming that the requisite state action has been found, courts traditionally
require that either the state intended to discriminate or that there was no rational
basis for the particular action. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955) (no rational basis); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (intent).
In addition, courts will require a showing of a supervening governmental interest
to justify a classification by race or some other "suspect trait." Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
29. Gautreaux v. Public Housing Authority: Equal Protection and Publicl
Housing, supra note 27, at 442.
30. See generally Hemphill, State Action and Civil Rights, 23 MERcER L. REV.
519 (1972); Kellett, The Expansion of Equality, 37 S. CAL. L. REv., 400, 402,
421 et seq. (1964); Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment and The State Action
Doctrine, 24 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 133 (1967).
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tion or when steps are not taken to correct the results of past wrongs.81
This expanded approach to equal protection comes close to hold-
ing the existence of de facto segregation a per se violation of the
fourteenth amendment.32 Although no court has yet gone that far,
the concept has been employed successfully in particular situations,
especially school desegregation. An emerging line of both federal and
state cases has held the failure of local school boards to take steps to
counteract the evils of de facto segregation to be an abridgement of
the fourteenth amendment.83 In Hobson v. Hansen34 the court stated
31. For a general discussion of this topic see Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Un-
equal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61
Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966); Kellet, supra note 30; Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969); Note, Low-Income Housing
and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 CORNELL L. Rzv. 343 (1971); Comment,
Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School Board, 81
HARv. L. REv. 1511 (1968). Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Se-
lection, supra note 20; Comment, Equal Protection in Urban Renewal Relocation,
1969 U. ILL. L.F. 105; Gautreaux v. Public Housing Authority: Equal Protec-
tion and Public Housing, supra note 27.
32. In many legal circles, the argument exists that racial classifications involved
in judicial desegregation orders are themselves per se violations of the fourteenth
amendment; that is, the fourteenth amendment does not permit racial classifica-
tions for any purpose. This contention, however, has found little judicial support,
especially when de jure segregation is involved. Arguably there is less justification
for the theory that racial classifications are permissible to remedy de facto segrega-
tion. Contentions range from claims that such action violates the first amend-
ment right to freedom of association to arguments that the primary function of
the courts is to end discrimination, not to force integration. Expanded equal pro-
tection advocates, however, counter that they are merely correcting past wrongs.
"If the only way to achieve racial balance is through the use of racial classifica-
tions, the purpose . . . fulfills the traditional requirement of 'overriding justifica-
tion' and permits the use of racial classifications." Racial Discrimination in Public
Housing Site Selection, supra note 20, at 129.
33. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d
385 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Hobson v. Han-
sen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc); Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm.,
237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965), vacated and remanded for dismissal with-
out prejudice on other grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Branche v. Board
of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Jackson v. Pasadena City School
Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963). The rationale
behind these cases is that racially segregated schools are demonstrably inferior
and consequently affirmative action is needed to meet the mandate of equal edu-
cational opportunities contained in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Some authors argue that Brown itself is authority for this approach to equal
protection in that the text of that opinion is replete with references to the detri-
mental effects and inherent inequality of segregated schools. Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, supra note 31, at 1184.
34. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
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that "[t]he complaint that analytically no violation of equal pro-
tection vests unless the inequalities stem from a deliberately dis-
criminatory plan is simply false." 5 The Hobson court granted affirm-
ative relief against practices which were neither discriminatory on
their face nor the product of a discriminatory scheme, but which
adversely affected the educational opportunities of a disadvantaged
minority.- In short, the failure of school boards to deal with de facto
segregation is tantamount to intending the result.37 Similar results
were obtained in voting rights,S public services39 and employment 4
discrimination cases.
Efforts to extend this added protection to public housing rights
after the Gautreaux and Hicks decisions have not been as successful,
or as conclusive, at least as far as site selection is concerned. In Carr
v. Brown,41 a claim against the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA)
which charged site selection discrimination was rejected because the
evidence indicated that 93% of the sites proposed by AHA were lo-
cated in all-white or racially mixed neighborhoods. In a well-reasoned
opinion, the court stated that intent to discriminate was not a pre-
requisite to a cause of action.42 Although the logic was persuasive, it
was not relevant to the holding since the case was dismissed on the facts
alone. In El Cortez Heights Residents and Property Owners Ass'n v.
Tucson Housing A uthority,4 the Court of Appeals of Arizona granted
35. Id. at 497.
36. See Hobson v. Hansen: judicial Supervision of the Color-Blind School
Board, supra note 31, at 1512.
37. See Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). See
also Kellett, supra note 30, for a discussion of the negative versus positive attri-
butes of the equal protection clause.
38. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
39. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). See Ellington
& Jones, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw: The Court as City Manager, 5 GA. L. Rav.
731 (1971).
40. United States v. Electrical Workers Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.
1970); Local 53, Heat & Frost InsuIators v. Voglet, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
41. This case was joined for trial with Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382
(N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
42. Id. at 391.
43. See note 17 supra.
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a temporary injunction to halt ground breaking on a local housing
project on the basis that the Tucson Housing Authority failed to in-
dude the racial impact of its programs in its site selection criteria. In-
clusion of such criteria was a significant step beyond Gautreaux and
Hicks where the parties were granted only the right to have racial fac-
tors excluded from site selection criteria. But again, the usefulness of
the decision is diminished by the fact that the Arizona court was not
faced with a muld-faceted problem of the same magnitude as in
Gautreaux, Hicks, or Banks.44
An opportunity to expand the protection given in Gautreaux and
Hicks was presented to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Shannon v. HUD,4 5 a case similar in the issues it raised to El
Cortez. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) had approved a modification of the Philadelphia urban
renewal plan for the East Poplar area, an almost all-black area,
in which planned single-family, owner-occupied homes were replaced
by a low-income housing project. Considering only land use factors,
HUD ruled that the alterations were minor and therefore dispensed
with the public hearing required by both statute and internal regula-
tions. In a suit to restrain HUD's support of the project, plaintiffs
contended that low-income housing in racially impacted areas was
not permissible under the fourteenth amendment and HUD's proce-
dures were inadequate since it did not consider the effects of placing
projects in racially concentrated neighborhoods. The court reversed
the district court's decision for HUD on the grounds that the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 make the segregative effect and integra-
tive potential of a project relevant factors that must be considered. 40
The court, therefore, held that HUD's procedures were inadequate.
Further assistance was to be restrained until HUD reconsidered the
effects of placing a low-income housing project on the site selected.
By holding "effect" to be only one relevant factor, the court avoided
44. The town of Tucson, Arizona does not suffer from severe racial imbalances.
The Arizona court was called upon to decide only whether the exclusion of
racial impact from its site selection criteria was legally significant. It did not
have to review the town's dispersal policies and it did not have to take significant
steps to implement its decision. The court found only that the placement of
public housing in racially impacted areas created doubts as to the legality of the
selection and ordered the Tucson Housing Authority to halt ground breaking
only until the court had reconsidered its decision.
45. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
46. Id. at 820.
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facing the issue of whether support for low-income housing in racially
concentrated areas is by itself a per se violation of the Civil Rights
Acts because such support encouraged continued segregation. 47
The Supreme Court has yet to express its opinion on the subject
of site selection for public housing. In James v. Valtierra,4s however,
it implicitly rejected the view that de facto housing segregation is
unconstitutional in the same sense as de facto school segregation. In
James, the Court upheld an article of the California constitution that
required approval by public referendum of all low-income public hous-
ing projects. The James case is similar in many respects to Gautreaux.
In both cases, the sites selected were subjected to outside approval,49
and, by statistical inference, it was obvious that discrimination was
in force since a substantially greater number of projects in white areas
were rejected than were in black areas. The Supreme Court, however,
did not formally recognize the site selection problem and merely held
that the referendum requirement was a valid exercise of democratic
decision making.5 The James decision, on this basis, appears incon-
sistent with past decisions.5 ' Its effect on site selection problems, how-
ever, is uncertain since the Court did not speak of Gautreaux even by
implication and the decision was itself totally ignored by the Banks
court.
The expanded approach to equal protection has not been totally
inoperative in the area of housing. In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redevelo~pment Agency,5- the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held the failure by defendants to find adequate housing for non-
whites displaced by urban renewal, when private discrimination
makes it difficult to find alternative housing, to be an equal protec-
47. Comment, Urban Renewal-HUD Has an Affirmative Duty to Consider
Low-Income Housing's Impact Upon Racial Concentration, 85 H.av. L. REv.
870 (1972).
48. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
49. Note that the Gautreaux II court held that it was immaterial that the
aldermen were merely reflecting the opinions of their constituents. Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. at 914. Why does an aldermanic
middleman make a difference?
50. The Court labored to distinguish Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339(1960), and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). Even a conservative
estimate, however, would deem the decision inconsistent with Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
51. See Comment, James v. Valtierra: Housing Discrimination by Referen-
dum?, 39 U. CHm. L. REv. 115 (1971).
52. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
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tion violation. Defendants were held accountable because they should
have foreseen the problem. 53 The court stated:
"Equal protection of the laws" means more than merely the
absence of governmental action designed to discriminate; . . .
we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thought-
lessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the
public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme. 4
Thus the fact that discrimination is "accidental" to, rather than in-
herent in, the administration of the program does not relieve the
planners of the duty to insure compliance with the Constitution.
Despite its positive attributes, one should recognize that Banks
v. Perk leaves many unsolved problems. First, local opposition to
court-ordered dispersal will obviously continue. Inevitably the result
will be a reduction in the rate of construction for needed units as
local authorities contrive more subtle ways to avoid the orders. Such
a reduction conflicts with another national goal, an adequate supply
of decent housing to meet community needs. Second, dispersal of
public housing which is to be inhabited by blacks may serve to break
down the political power of the black community and sever cultural
ties. Third, a dispersal program assumes that blacks will want to
move into white neighborhoods, and that employment will be avail-
able. Finally, direct judicial supervision assumes that courts and
judges have the expertise to handle the diverse social and economic
problems that accompany any comprehensive plan to relocate a city's
people and resources.55
Charles Dean
53. Id. at 931.
54. Id.
55. On appeal, the order in Count I of Banks v. Perk has been reversed in
part. 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973). The city of Cleveland appealed the de-
cisions as it applies to both defendants. Significantly, CMHA joined with plain.
tiffs on a motion to dismiss the appeal, as far as it applies to the order against
CMHA.
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